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Towards a Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Japan’s Strategic Vision and Regional Engagement

Jiyu Choi, Aix-Marseille Université, DAIP/LERMA

Postwar Japanese Policy toward “Asia-Pacific”:

          The Asian regional order, which had been constructed under Japan’s imperialist framework during the war, split and transformed into the Cold War’s systemic competition. After its defeat, Japan aligned itself with the U.S.-led international order within the Cold War, pursuing economic growth based on the U.S.-Japan security relationship.

Japan’s emphasis on the “Asia-Pacific” concept emerged in the late 1960s amid its growing economic power and the need for industrial restructuring. First articulated by Foreign Minister Takeo Miki, the concept envisioned cooperation between developed Pacific nations and developing Asian states, with Japan serving as the bridge between them. Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira’s 1979 “Pacific Rim Solidarity Initiative” reinforced this vision. By the 1970s and 1980s, as Japan’s economy flourished, “Asia-Pacific” became key regional framework balancing ties with advanced Western nations and collaborative engagement with Asia.

Following the end of the Cold War, Japan’s diplomatic horizons broadened. The engagement with Asia-Pacific moved beyond building industrial bases toward pursuing regional economic integration in “East Asia”. This shift was shaped by global trends of regional integration in Europe and North America, the reduced U.S. role in East Asia after the Cold War, economic frictions between Japan and the U.S, the growing economic weight of East Asia, and China’s rise and expanding influence over ASEAN. Accordingly, the term “East Asia” began to replace “Asia-Pacific.” While Japan had emphasized the Pacific dimension and conceived of itself as a “bridge” between Asia and the Pacific, the government in the 1990s came to recognize East Asia itself as a distinct economic region.

Shinzo Abe’s Indo-Pacific Strategy/Vision:

The rise of China in the 2000s marked a shift in the direction of Japanese diplomacy towards East Asia and the regional strategic order. The first Shinzo Abe Cabinet, formed in 2006, pursued a “values-based diplomacy” emphasizing democracy and the rule of law, along with the “arc of freedom and prosperity” initiative. In response to China’s maritime rise, India’s economic growth, and the deepening U.S.-India relationship, Japan reevaluated India’s strategic role and pursued strengthened relations with India. In his 2007 Indian Parliament address titled “Confluence of the Two Seas,” Abe defined the Pacific and Indian Oceans as a single free and prosperous space, emphasizing that freedom of navigation and stability were inseparably linked. He also proposed that Japan and India, as partners sharing the values of democracy and freedom, cooperate with the United States and Australia.[1] This presented a new regional concept through linking the Indian Ocean and the Pacific, serving as an opportunity to expand the scope of Japanese diplomacy from East Asia to the Indian Ocean and West Asia.

The Shinzo Abe administration, which regained power in December 2012, proposed an “Indo-Pacific’ strategy” to further expand the scope of its security strategy. This emerged against the backdrop of growing perceptions of a Chinese threat within Japan following the 2010 and 2012 Senkaku Islands clashes, coupled with mounting concerns over the weakening of U.S. hegemony as the Obama administration did not effectively counter China’s expansion into the East and South China Seas. With the sense of external security crisis in Japan, Abe proposed a four-nation security cooperation framework linking the U.S. state of Hawaii, Japan, India, and Australia to safeguard a free and open maritime order, alongside the concept of the “democratic security diamond”.[2]  That is, the idea was to establish a “diamond” linking Japan, India, Australia, and the United States, promoting security cooperation through consultations and joint exercises. Its aim was to draw India into East Asian affairs, counter China’s maritime expansion, and safeguard sea lanes from the Indian to the Pacific Ocean. By extending the framework to partners such as the UK and France, it underscored democratic solidarity, shared values, and the indivisible security of the Pacific and Indian Oceans.

“Democratic security diamond”

At the 2016 Sixth Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD VI), Abe presented the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy” as Japan’s foreign policy framework. As a core concept in Japanese diplomacy, Abe declared that Japan would strengthen the connectivity between two continents and two oceans—the Pacific and Indian Oceans, and Asia and Africa—and cultivate this space as one that values “freedom, the rule of law, and market economies over force or power.”[3]  The “Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP)[4]” was institutionalized as Japan’s foreign policy strategy in 2018, framing the Indo-Pacific as a core space for global stability and prosperity. Grounded in the principle of a rule-based maritime order as an international public good, FOIP seeks to advance three pillars: (1) safeguarding freedom of navigation and the rule of law, (2) fostering connectivity and economic growth through high-quality infrastructure, and (3) enhancing peace and stability via capacity-building in maritime law enforcement.

In this context, during the Abe administration, Japan advanced the FOIP as a new foreign and security strategy in response to intensifying U.S.-China strategic rivalry. The strategy reflected three key features. First, FOIP represented a geopolitical framework, expanding beyond the Asia-Pacific to incorporate the Indian Ocean and bring India into a U.S.-Japan-centered regional order. Second, it emphasized regional strategic partnerships such as Australia and India as a means to contain China’s influence. Third, it sought to ensure U.S. engagement, thereby reinforcing Japan’s security strategy within the broader Indo-Pacific order.

The rise of the Indo-Pacific concept in international relations

The FOIP vision initiated under Abe was carried through the short-lived Suga administration and further developed under Kishida as the “New Plan for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific.” While not explicitly naming China, it reflected a stronger perception of China as the “greatest strategic challenge” and identified Russia as an additional threat. The plan emphasized international public goods and the strategic use of ODA toward the Global South. The Ishiba administration, inaugurated in October 2024, has largely inherited this trajectory, prioritizing the expansion of security networks. Centered on the U.S.-Japan alliance, it seeks to reinforce minilateral frameworks such as the Quad, U.S.-Japan-ROK, and U.S.-Japan-Philippines, while also deepening cooperation with NATO members and ASEAN.

Meanwhile, Japan’s “Indo-Pacific” concept has also been extended to international relations. At the U.S.-Japan summit held during President Trump’s visit to Japan in 2017, Prime Minister Abe and President Trump agreed to deepen U.S.-Japan cooperation under the vision of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific.” This served as a catalyst. In the National Security Strategy released in December 2017, the United States began formally emphasizing the importance of the Indo-Pacific region, referring to it as such instead of the Asia-Pacific. The concept of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific,” actively led and conceptualized by Japan, has now become widely recognized in the foreign policies of major partners including Australia, India, the EU, the UK, France, Germany, Italy and South Korea. Emphasizing the rule of law, human rights, and democratic governance, the Indo-Pacific vision has evolved into one of the most influential frameworks shaping 21st-century regional order and global strategic competition.

[1] “Confluence of the Two Seas”, Speech by H.E.Mr. Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister of Japan at the Parliament of the Republic of India, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. August 22, 2007.

(https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/pmv0708/speech-2.html)

[2] Asia’s Democratic Security Diamond, Dec 27, 2012. Abe Shinzō (https://www.project-syndicate.org/magazine/a-strategic-alliance-for-japan-and-india-by-shinzo-abe)

[3] Address by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at the Opening Session of the Sixth Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD VI), August 27, 2016.

(https://www.mofa.go.jp/afr/af2/page4e_000496.html)

[4] Japan’s Indo-Pacific “Strategy” was initially referred to interchangeably as “vision” in consideration of its relationship with China, but by 2019 it was renamed Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP).

 


OpenEdition vous propose de citer ce billet de la manière suivante :
OREMA (9 décembre 2025). Towards a Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Japan’s Strategic Vision and Regional Engagement. OREMA. Consulté le 9 février 2026 à l’adresse https://doi.org/10.58079/15b9a


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